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Preventing Card-Skimming Identity Theft

Skimming is one of the financial industry’s fastest-growing crimes, according to the U.S. Secret Service. The worldwide ATM Industry Association reports over $1 billion in annual global losses from credit card fraud and electronic crime associated with ATMs.

Skimming can occur in a few different ways. The most common is when a store clerk takes your card and runs it through a device that copies the information from the magnetic strip. Once the thief has the credit or debit card data, he or she can place orders over the phone or online. Thieves can also copy the data on blank cards, or “white” cards. White cards are effective at self checkouts, or when the thief knows the clerk and is able to “sweetheart” the transaction. A white card can also be pressed with foils to look like a legitimate credit card, as seen in this video.

The PCI Security Standards Council provides guidelines designed to help merchants securely store and transmit card account data and prevent it from falling into the hands of criminals. Retailers who fail to comply with PCI’s standards can be fined up to $500,000 by credit card providers such as Visa and MasterCard. PCI recently released a series of recommendations for the prevention of skimming scams. “Skimming is becoming a widespread problem. These are guidelines for what retailers should be looking at with their reader devices”, says Bob Russo, general manager of the PCI SSC. “We discuss different techniques for protecting those point-of-sale devices.”

The PCI Council’s “Skimming Prevention: Best Practices for Merchants” guidelines include a risk assessment questionnaire and self-evaluation forms to gauge susceptibility to these types of attacks and to determine where they need to shore up their defenses. The guidelines cover how to educate and protect employees who handle the point of sale devices from being targeted, as well as ways to prevent and deter compromise of those devices. They also detail how to identify a rigged reader and what to do about it, and how physical location of the devices and stores can raise risk.

Thieves can completely replace a merchant’s point of sale terminal with a device that is rigged to record or divert card data wirelessly, or simply store the data until the criminal comes back and removes it. (This is what happened to Stop and Shop.)

Criminals can also place a device on the face of an ATM, which appears to be a part of the machine.  It’s almost impossible for civilians to know the difference unless they have an eye for security, or the skimmer is of poor quality. Often, the thieves will hide a small pinhole camera in a brochure holder near the ATM, in order to extract the victim’s pin number. Gas pumps are equally vulnerable to this type of scam.

A customer at a New York City bank discovered a skimming device on the face of an ATM, and went inside the bank to inform the branch manager. The manager, who had never seen an ATM skimmer and wasn’t sure what to do, took the skimmer and thanked him. The customer then remembered, from numerous reports about ATM skimming, that there is usually a second part to the ATM skimmer, the camera. In this case, he found it behind a small mirror that alerts the ATM user to beware of “shoulder surfers.” He brought the camera to the bank manager, who replied by saying, “Maybe we should shut that machine down, huh?” The bank manager contacted bank security, shut down the machine, and alerted other area banks.

To help combat this type of crime, ADT unveiled the ADT Anti-Skim ATM Security Solution, which helps prevent skimming attempts and detects skimming devices on all major ATM makes and models. ADT’s anti-skim solution is installed inside an ATM near the card reader, making it invisible from the outside. The solution detects the presence of foreign devices placed over or near an ATM card entry slot, without disrupting the customer transaction or operation of most ATMs. It can trigger a silent alarm for command center response and coordinate video surveillance of all skimming activities. Also, the technology helps prevent card-skimming attempts by interrupting the operation of an illegal card reader. This technology does not require any software adjustments be made to the ATM itself, and does not connect to or affect the ATM communications network. Prior to its North American introduction, the ADT Anti-Skim ATM Security Solution was successfully field tested on dozens of ATMs of four major U.S. financial institutions in controlled pilot programs. Testing pilots yielded positive results, with no known skimming compromises occurring.

You can protect yourself from these types of scams by paying attention to your statements and refuting any unauthorized transactions within 60 days. When using an ATM, pay close attention to details, and look for anything that seems out of place. If your card gets stuck in the machine or you notice anything odd about the appearance of the machine, such as wires, double sided tape, error messages, a missing security camera, or if the machine seems unusually old and run down, don’t use it. Don’t use just any ATM. Instead, look for ATMs in more secure locations. Use strong PINs, with both upper and lowercase letters, as well as numbers. 

Robert Siciliano, identity theft expert, discusses ATM skimming on Fox News.

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Comments: (5)

Joe Pitcher
Joe Pitcher - Irrelevant - Wirral 10 September, 2009, 09:21Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

Surely the best way to eliminate skimming is to remove the mag stripe. You can't clone what isn't there.

 

Robert Siciliano
Robert Siciliano - Safr.me - Boston 10 September, 2009, 12:41Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

With 1.5 billion cards in circulation worldwide, removing the magstripe is no simple task. That means every reader and every machine has to be refitted. I doubt we will ever see the magstipe go away. There are to many technologies relying on it and many technologies coming to secure it, or at least make its insecurity a non issue.

Nick Green
Nick Green - ISD Consultants - Northampton 10 September, 2009, 18:21Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

Why does the industry continue to expend effort on trying to secure the magstripe when it is just money down the drain (watermark magnetic et al.)? I agree that the magstripe may stay but purely as a means for unattended devices to ensure you have the card the right way round. The answer is to use IC Cards where you have a secure environment to store the data. EMV expands throughout the world and in every country it is introduced fraud goes down; the issue is that as everyone closes the front door the back door is left wide open in the US.

I'm not saying that chip cards are the answer to everything (I'll leave that to some of the purveyors of solutions who have 'the answer') there is no single solution to combating fraud it always has been a layered approach. But putting an active component in the cardholders' hands gives you the ability to develop solution for Card Not Present that would further limit the opportunity for fraud.
To plagiarise 'The Borg' "EMV - you will comply - resistance is futile".

Joe Pitcher
Joe Pitcher - Irrelevant - Wirral 11 September, 2009, 08:37Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

Robert,

I agree it's not an easy task. The question is how concerned are people/goverments/banks about the level of fraud? Its fine saying it's expensive and difficult, I agree it is, but EMV does exist and works quite nicely without a Mag stripe.

There are other solutions - someone will no doubt try and sell one on here in the next few hours - but none in the 'real world' yet other than EMV.

At what point does the cost get outweighed by the benefit? If we can prevent terrorists obtaining funding through fraud and prevent hundreds/thousands of death is that worth the pain of replacing cards and upgrading devices?

Stephen Wilson
Stephen Wilson - Lockstep Consulting - Sydney 12 September, 2009, 03:39Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

I agree strongly with Nick and Joe.  Yes there are alternatives to chip cards to address card skimming, and there is a host of non-chip solutions to other fraud modalities too, but they're all ad hoc, or short term.

It's important I think to focus on the underlying vulnerability that enables most identity related frauds, namely the replayability of ordinary digital data.  To properly tackle most payment fraud, we must prevent the replay of ID data (most feasibly through asymmetric cryptography i.e. digital signatures).  And we should protect users against real time fraudsters (phishers, pharmers) through intelligent personal security devices.

In plain English, the unique and powerful thing about smartcards is they can tell what's going on around them.  Smartcards (and their intelligent cousins SIMs, smartphones, USB keys etc.) can act as proxies for their owners. They can test the digital bona fides of web sites and of terminal equipment, detect Man-in-the-Middle attacks, detect spam, and self-monitor to tell if they're being used inappropriately. 

So ... we can keep tinkering with magnetic stripes, end-to-end encryption, tokenization and two factor authentication, to erect short term barriers to specific attack vectors, but with significant total cost and at teh expense of user confusion and divergence.  Or, we can transition to a single, fundamentally robust, extensible, long term approach to all digital ID protection, using chip cards to address skimming, counterfeiting, CNP fraud, and ID theft all at the same time.

Cheers,

Stephen Wilson, Lockstep.

 

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