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As contactless payments become ubiquitous, fraudsters are evolving new tactics to exploit them. A Near Field Communication (NFC) relay attack is one such threat. It intercepts and relays the communication between a contactless card (or phone) and a payment terminal over a longer distance. In simple terms, an attacker uses a proxy device to “extend” the range of the victim’s card. For example, a card in your pocket could be surreptitiously activated by a rogue reader and its signal relayed in real-time to another device across town, which then completes a purchase as if your card was present.
A “Ghost Tap” attack is a specialized form of NFC relay attack that criminals are using to fake contactless transactions via cloned or proxied signals. First observed in late 2024, Ghost Tap (as dubbed by ThreatFabric researchers) allows crooks to cash out stolen cards linked to mobile wallets (like Apple Pay or Google Pay) by relaying NFC payment data to a distant point-of-sale. In these schemes, hackers obtain a victim’s card credentials and one-time password, add the card to their own digital wallet, and then use a relay of two smartphones to make purchases anywhere, even continents away without the physical card or phone present. This threat is on the rise, with banks and fintechs reporting a wave of NFC-based fraud in recent months. It bridges the gap between card-present and card-on-file ecosystems, turning stolen digital card data into fraudulent in-person transactions.
In a Ghost Tap scenario, the fraud unfolds in multiple stages. Often the attackers begin by stealing the card details and any required OTP (one-time password) to enroll the card into a mobile wallet. This is accomplished via malware on the victim’s phone (capturing card data and SMS codes) or phishing scams. Once the card is provisioned on the attacker’s device, they avoid using it directly (which could tie the device to the crime). Instead, they set up a relay: using a tool like NFCGate, the attacker’s phone (holding the stolen card token) acts as an NFC reader and sends the tap-to-pay signal over the internet to a second device held by a “money mule”. The mule’s phone, running the same tool, emulates the victim’s card to a store’s POS terminal, effectively spoofing a legitimate tap at the checkout.
Several attack variations have been observed in practice: point-of-sale spoofing can involve fake or tampered merchant terminals set up by fraudsters to route transactions remotely. In some cases, organized rings have even registered fraudulent merchant POS devices under mule identities, so that transactions from stolen cards appear as normal retail sales. Another angle is stolen token replay, as in Ghost Tap, criminals leverage the tokenized card data from mobile wallets. They might rapidly purchase easily resellable goods (e.g. gift cards, electronics) at multiple stores using the same stolen token, before the issuer blocks it. Attackers have also manipulated ATM or POS software (such as with the Track2NFC exploit) to force offline approvals, though these techniques are more complex.
On the surface, these relay/ghost attacks can look just like ordinary contactless transactions, which is what makes them so insidious. The payment requests carry valid credentials (the victim’s card token) and often pass cryptographic checks. To the bank’s systems, it appears the rightful cardholder’s device made a normal tap payment. Ghost Tap operations intentionally keep each transaction small and routine-looking, sometimes using many under-the-radar purchases to avoid tripping velocity or amount thresholds. The use of globally dispersed accomplices means the fraud doesn’t have a single location fingerprint. In short, a Ghost Tap transaction is designed to blend in with legitimate taps, making detection challenging without deeper contextual signals.
While ghost taps aim to masquerade as normal payments, a good fraud system can uncover subtle inconsistencies. Key metadata signals to monitor include:
Each of these signals alone provides a piece of the picture. When correlated, they can expose the “ghost in the machine”, the subtle fraud that hides within normal-looking taps.
To illustrate, here are a couple of simplified rule examples combining multiple metadata conditions:
Rule 1: If transaction.entry_mode == "NFC" AND transaction.device_ID not in customer’s known device history AND IP_country != merchant_country → Flag for Review.
transaction.entry_mode == "NFC"
transaction.device_ID
IP_country != merchant_country
Rationale: This rule catches cases where a contactless tap comes from an unknown device and a network location mismatch, a strong indicator of an NFC relay or cloned device scenario. (A genuine card tap at a store would normally use a familiar device/token and local network. A divergence suggests a proxy in play.)
Rule 2: If merchant_ID is in the list of “low-velocity merchants” AND the card sees 5+ transactions in 10 minutes at that merchant → Flag for Review.
merchant_ID
Rationale: Even small ghost tap purchases leave a pattern, fraudsters often run numerous transactions in quick succession to maximize stolen card usage before being caught. Many brick-and-mortar merchants (especially for high-value goods or services) would never see the same card tapped repeatedly in a short span. This rule spotlights an unusual burst of activity at a merchant that typically wouldn’t have rapid repeat swipes, which could mean a mule is testing or cashing out a stolen token.
These are just examples. In practice, effective rules can get quite granular, factoring in time-of-day (e.g. blocking late-night rapid taps), cardholder travel status, prior fraud alerts on the device, and so on. The key is that multiple weak signals, when combined, form a strong fraud indicator. Flagright’s engine makes it easy to implement such complex rules and even simulate their impact before deploying them, so fraud teams can fine-tune detection without disrupting normal customers.
NFC relay and ghost tap attacks underscore that fraud prevention must look beyond surface transaction data. When transactions “look” normal to basic checks, it’s the context and metadata that reveal the truth. By rapidly analyzing attributes like entry mode, device identity, location, and behavioral patterns, financial institutions can expose schemes that would otherwise fly under the radar. Importantly, this needs to happen in real time, stopping the fraud as it happens. Ghost Tap attackers operate at internet speed and on a global scale; only an equally fast, data-driven defense can counter them. The impact is significant: without advanced detection models and robust rules, these anonymous, scalable fraud methods present major challenges for banks and payment providers.
The good news is that with the right tools, we can fight back.
This content is provided by an external author without editing by Finextra. It expresses the views and opinions of the author.
Muhammad Qasim Senior Software Developer at PSPC
16 October
Adam Preis Global Strategist at Ping Identity
Naina Rajgopalan Content Head at Freo
Mete Feridun Chair at EMU Centre for Financial Regulation and Risk
15 October
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