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Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud grew 39% in 2021- little justice so who shot the APP Sheriff?

The scenario: On Facebook, a fake Airbnb website offers accommodation that includes a faster payment deposit of £1,000.  It was a scam and the money gone. 

  Airbnb noted it was fake website and says call your bank                     

Refuses any type of reimbursement

  Facebook advice is call your bank                                       

Refuses any type reimbursement

  Your Bank calls Payee Bank and told “no money in that account”        

 Refuses reimbursement

             So who shot the Sheriff as APP frauds soar 39%

             Not me say the banker, my client authorised the payment

             Nor me say telecom, we give communication access 

             Nor says I with social media platforms, we just allow websites paid ads

 The victim (X) of the scam is left to look upon the options for recovering the money:

 1.    Appealing the Bank’s decision to Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)

  A.  As the scammer needs to have a bank account it would be natural to think that the scammer’s bank would be liable for any loss. Not so, in fact the ones who are actually responsible for the fraud loss are the victims with 60% plus Payer Banks reimbursements of 40%.

    B. FOS record of overturning banks’ negative decisions is often exceeding 50%. Recommend the banks use a more consistent and reliable approach to the decision-making. A further issue is the timeframe; banks can take up to 45 days to investigate a fraud with the addition of FOS with a similar timeframe for the appeal. Also the effort required for victims to provide the information required for the FOS appeal.

  C.   In the four years 2018 to 2022 APP fraud, now the No. 1 UKFinance Fraud category, £1.15 billion was not reimbursed out of £1.81 billion reported scammed.

  Is there an opportunity for a PPI-type claim service for victims?

 2.    Reporting the scam to the Police/ActionFraud

 A. It is rare for the Police to participate directly in many of the reported frauds unless it is very large, for example, over £100,000.

  B. ActionFraud is the national reporting centre for frauds. It does not have investigative powers and passes the information to The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau to assess the most appropriate action. It has been estimated that 96% of all frauds reported are not investigated.

C. Given the resources available to the Police to investigate all types of fraud, estimated at 3% of the their resources, only the most important frauds receive action. Law Court convictions for any type of fraud are few and declining.

 3.    Accepting the loss and emotional distress and not reporting

 A. It is estimated that the UKFinance fraud figures should be increased by 40% more than reported. The reasons are the psychological and emotional impacted of being scammed as well as the financial loss. The lack of empathy from the banks. The injustice currently in place. Only when the money is important and/or it’s what a just society would accept then fraud is reported. 

             Who shot the Sheriff as digital scammers taking £millions 

             Not me say the regulators we need time to consult 

             Nor me say Law enforcement, as this is a new digital not a physical crime

             Nor say us, the scammers; as there was no sheriff or deputy on call

 Victim (X) picked 3 and accepted losing £1,000 knowing chances of justice were slim.

Lots of unconnected parties, missing appropriate regulations, no one responsible for cyber policing, victims blamed, no physical presence of fraudsters and remote chance of conviction. We need a Sheriff* for APP justice.

 

 

*https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oe2hdbft5-U

 

 

 

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Comments: (2)

Ketharaman Swaminathan
Ketharaman Swaminathan - GTM360 Marketing Solutions - Pune 07 September, 2022, 09:06Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

Instead of lamenting about things that don't exist, let's ask what happened to things that do exist: Technology, Responsibility, etc.

Why didn't Confirmation of Payee stop this scam from happening in the first place? At the point of initiating the payment, CoP should have warned the Payor / Alleged Victim that the Payee is not a genuine AirBnB. Why didn't it?

If it did, did the Payor ignore the warning?

Coincidentally, I just published a post in this topic earlier today:

Fraud v Scam: Who Is Liable For Cybercrime

Jeremy Light
Jeremy Light - pingNpay - London 07 September, 2022, 10:19Be the first to give this comment the thumbs up 0 likes

A big dent could be made in APP fraud by requiring the beneficiary bank to check the beneficiary name on the incoming payment matches the name on the beneficiary account.

This check is missing in bank systems because historically Sort Code and bank number have been the identifier used since electronic payments started with BACS.

This check is a very simple one to make for banks, but presumably it remains unimplemented to avoid unmanageable numbers of rejected/suspended payments due to minor diferences in the sent name and correct name. However, if CoP is implemented by all banks for all types of accounts and without an option for the sender to override discrepancies flagged by CoP, then it would shut down a significant amount of APP fraud.

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