Member since
Bill Trueman

Bill Trueman

Director at
Posts: 0 Comments: 62

Bill is Commenting on

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

  KS - I agree with previous anonymous sender. It appears that you have not thought this through. The paying customer (your ‘payor’) may not be involved - albeit often a little stupid / naive. It is often the fraudster that is imitating them. The fraudster cons the paying customer who has done nothing wrong. The paying bank does what is instructed. FOLLOW THE MONEY. The only faults are a) the fraudster motivations and dishonesty, b) the receiving banks that have opened up accounts for fraudsters without knowing who they are or where they are or being able to track them, and c) the receiving banks that make payments that are circumspect, not having proper ID and not knowing how or where the money is going, d) the receiving bank when it disburses the money to other receding banks with no responsibility, accountability or considerations of the suspicions involved, e) the receiving banks that then, hide behind the GDPR for not assisting in the investigations and showing their failings for fear of the legal liability for their failings, and f) the reviving banks for not correcting the position because they have no loss. (Worse: often they can make a profit from this by recovering funds and not repatriating the money but applying it to P&L!). Can you see the theme? This is a matter of law and regulatory rules that favour the “payor” (not really a word here). So your suggestions are NOT legally appropriate or fair to customer in the UK. Losing life-savings as a victim of a con, is not always a fair way to attribute liability. Your solution is unfair, unethical, and against the regulatory principles.

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

  Hi Jackie - surely postponement means that the sending banks (and the conned customers) end up paying for the frauds, and that the receiving banks, having a reprise from suffering the losses- will continue to allow the fraudsters to open accounts and withdraw the money from the ‘system’. it is these receding banks , as the figures have shown, that are allowing this to happen. If these receiving banks had strong AML / KYC controls, and knew their customers (fraudsters), then they would have no problems contacting them, getting the money back (100% of the money!), and/or prosecuting the offenders. 100% liability on the receiving bank would very quickly address the problem, and would tighten up AML / KYC issues. Stalling, and keeping liability with the ‘sending banks’ will allow the problem to continue. The sending banks have spent £millions in repeatedly annoying us with ‘are you sure?’ messages to no avail. And legislation is required to allow better communications. When a sending bank say to a receiving bank: ‘stop the payment to the fraudster’, ‘this is fraud - send it back’ etc; the answer is usually: ‘go away, GDPR applies’ in order to hide/protect the KYC failings. What do you think should happen? ‘Hoping’ that it will be solved when the law prevents it and the culprits (receiving banks and fraudsters gain from this - so are motivated NOT to act) is not really a viable solution. This has been the brunt of the solution for five years and has not worked.